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Abstract
This thesis presents a novel security system developed for a multi-channel commu-
nication architecture, which achieves security by distributing the message and its
associated message authentication code across the available channels at the bit level,
to support systems that require protection from confidentiality and integrity attacks
without relying solely on traditional encryption. One contribution of the work is to
establish some helpful terminology, present a basic theory for multi-channel commu-
nications, describe the services provided by an optimal system, and then implement
a proof of concept system to demonstrate the concept’s validity. This proof of con-
cept, focused on the splitting and recombination activities, operates by using existing
key exchange mechanisms to establish system initialization information, and then
splitting the message in fragments across each available channel. Splitting prevents
the entirety of a given message from being transmitted across a single channel, and
spreads the overall message authentication across the set of channels. This gives the
end user the following unique service: the sender and receiver can identify a com-
promised channel, even in the presence of a sophisticated man in the middle attack
wherein the adversary achieves fragment acceptance at the destination by altering the
message’s error detecting code. Under some conditions, the receiver can recover the
original message without retransmission, despite these injected errors. The result-
ing system may be attractive for critical infrastructure communications systems as
a holistic approach to both availability and a defense against integrity attacks. This
system would be a natural fit as a cipher suite for a future iteration of the Transport
Layer Security protocol targeting support for multi-channel communication systems.
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MULTI-CHANNEL SECURITY THROUGH DATA FRAGMENTATION
I. Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Consumers rely increasingly on the communication of private, confidential, and
sensitive information over the internet for everyday activities. Accordingly, individ-
uals and organizations rely on security services, such as encryption, to secure those
communications. Encryption is the most prevalent service used for these purposes
because it provides strong guarantees that an adversary cannot, in a reasonable time,
transform the encrypted transmission into a usable format and extract information.
The fundamental strength of the cryptographic process is that decryption is com-
putationally expensive in the absence of the session’s key. A block cipher relies on
the computational complexity of deducing the key given the algorithm, the plaintext,
and a corresponding ciphertext. Common block ciphers may specify different length
keys in order to achieve greater security at the expense of more computation. For
example, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) allows three separate key lengths -
128, 192, and 256 bits [1], with the larger sizes providing greater security.
The popular Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) Algorithm utilizes both a public key
and private key to exchange information and generate a shared session key. This algo-
rithm’s security relies on the computational challenge of factoring increasingly large
integers [2]. These two algorithms combine into a well-known encryption paradigm
in which a form of RSA or public key encryption is used to generate a session key,
which is then used to encrypt the data using a block cipher such as AES. There is
1
concern that quantum computing may be able to reduce the time and cost of decryp-
tion so much that encryption is rendered useless. Overlooking that threat, however,
encryption may still not be suitable for every application. High bandwidth or latency
sensitive communications may not tolerate the computational cost and imposed la-
tency. Low power devices may not be able to afford the computation required for
encryption. In addition, traditional communications rely on a single channel, repre-
senting a single point of failure for availability, as well as a single location of intercept
for an adversary.
Related technologies are also used to provide authentication, providing assurance
to one communicating entity that the other entity is who they claim to be. In addition
to the traditional public key infrastructure approach to authentication, many systems
also employ two factor authentication. This system functions by requiring a user to
provide two of the following items:
1. Something they know
2. Something they have
3. Something they are
One common approach is the combination of a security password or PIN, which only
the user knows, and a code sent to the user, often on a separate channel, such as a
text message, which becomes something they have. This reduces the chance of an
adversary compromising the system by gaining access to a single piece (channel) of
information. Two-factor authentication demonstrates the security provided by using
different pieces (channels) of information. This raises the following question: instead
of relying on two-factor authentication, what if a system used two+ factor (or channel)
communication?
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The use of multiple channels implies that an adversary would require the compro-
mise of multiple communication channels to conduct an attack. The multi-channel
protocol presented in this research provides security by restricting the amount of in-
formation an adversary can access upon interception, as well as providing increased
assurance of message integrity by duplicating and fragmenting information across the
set of available channels. Previous work by Wolfe demonstrated the use of multi-
channel communications for applications in low power devices [3]. In that research,
security was achieved by splitting data across two channels, and if adversarial action
was detected, limiting or stopping the flow of information on the affected channel.
This work will extend the previous effort, as well as providing a new method of
fragmenting data across the channels to achieve increased security.
1.2 Research Objectives
The first objective of this thesis is to identify specific security benefits and services
a multi-channel, data fragmenting protocol/architecture provides. The transforma-
tion from the single channel to a multi-channel domain requires an acceptance of
higher overhead – there are simply more connections to maintain and synchronize.
Thus, there must be a significant security benefit driving that shift. Without this
defined benefit, there would be no motivation for systems to make the switch. The
second objective is to identify challenges impeding the creation and use of such a
protocol. The shift to multi-channel communications would require existing network
protocols to adapt to handle the splitting and assembling of data from multiple data
connections, potentially through different mediums. However, a multi-channel pro-
tocol should be built on existing, well-researched, and well-trusted protocols. This
would enable an efficient shift from single to multi-channel communications. To ac-
complish this goal, the specific challenges to a multi-channel communication protocol
3
must be understood.
1.3 Approach
The first step in accomplishing the objectives above is to define terminology for
the discussion of multi-channel communications. This is necessary to ensure that
all parties communicate precisely about the design decisions and operation of future
iterations of the multi-channel protocol. This terminology is first applied to a theo-
retical multi-channel communication system, after which a proof of concept system
will be developed to demonstrate the operation of such a system. This proof of con-
cept system will identify challenges to the creation of a multi-channel communication
protocol, demonstrate the security benefits for a user, and finally to discover areas
where the end user can make design decisions based on their specific use case. The
lessons of this system will be discussed.
1.4 Contributions
The primary contributions of this thesis are to demonstrate the security benefits of
a multi-channel, data fragmenting protocol, as well as to identify remaining challenges
that must be solved to implement such a system. Additionally, this effort will define
a relevant vocabulary for describing a multi-channel system. This work can then
provide a theoretical roadmap of the design considerations and trade-offs necessary
to develop and field a multi-channel communication system, as well as the services
gained through its use. These insights will serve as a foundation and an inspiration
for multi-channel communication development in the years to come.
1.5 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows:
4
Chapter II introduces the relevant background information of the topic, beginning
with the relationship between aspects of the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
(CIA) Triad, several widely-utilized categories of attacks, and the specific security
configuration required by an end user. Note that these security configurations are
typically reliant on single channels for communication. The chapter presents prelimi-
nary work into the developing field of multi-channel communications, including work
into a two-channel system, as well as the theoretical implications of an n channel
system. Several security mechanisms are considered for application within a multi-
channel communication protocol, as well as the potential area for its implementation.
Chapter III presents the theory/terminology required for the discussion of multi-
channel communications, and utilizes that vocabulary to describe a theoretical sys-
tem. This theoretical system allows an investigation into the benefits of a multi-
channel system, without regard for specific design decisions or system requirements,
and highlights the potential benefits of such a system. This theoretical model is
then followed to build a prototype system which can achieve several of the suggested
benefits, demonstrating the possibility of creating this system through existing tech-
nologies.
Chapter IV describes the operation of the proof of concept model, which was cre-
ated using the Python scripting language, and represents the first step toward building
a fully functional multi-channel system. The model makes several design decisions,
such as the Trivium cipher as the splitting mechanism and Message Authentication
Codes (MACs) such as the 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) or Reed-Solomon
(RS) Code providing error detection and error correction, respectively. By using a
scripting language such as Python, it isolates the operation of the system from all
other environmental factors. This chapter concludes by describing the specific test
cases which will be utilized to verify and learn from the model’s operation.
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Chapter V presents the design trade-offs: what drove specific design decisions,
and at what cost? It analyzes the trade space between various parameters and the
services they provide such as the percentage of incurred overhead, or the ability to
defeat adversarial actions. It explores the operation of the proof of concept system,
illustrating that it does indeed function as designed. Finally, it analyzes the insights
gained through the creation and use of the proof of concept system, despite the rather
deterministic nature of the test cases.
Chapter VI concludes the work. It details the contributions to the field such as
demonstrating the security benefits of a multi-channel, data fragmenting protocol. It
describes the future work that can follow this thesis, specifically what needs to be
done to take this prototyped system to a fielded, operational system.
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II. Background and Related Work
2.1 Overview
This work follows an initial effort to create a multi-channel communication pro-
tocol [3], which proposed multi-channel communications as a viable security alterna-
tive for systems that may not use encryption, such as low-power devices. However,
for devices which cannot reconcile the additional computational and power costs, a
multi-channel system might not actually be better. The introduction of additional
transceivers might have an adverse effect on the system’s power efficiency, perform-
ing worse than a single channel system with encryption. Thus, a holistic approach
must be used to determine the appropriate security scheme for a given use case.
The trade-off between power, computational complexity, and latency must be consid-
ered for future applications and desired services, such as security in a post-quantum
world, providing availability guarantees, and providing a warning system for integrity
attacks. Wolfe et al. describe how the use of multiple channels can thwart both
an eavesdropping attack by splitting the data across two channels, and an integrity
attack by duplicating the information across two channels. However, they do not
mention specific mechanisms to split or duplicate the data, nor do they consider per-
forming both tasks simultaneously. This work will extend that effort by proposing a
specific mechanism for splitting the message across available channels, and identifies
several tunable characteristics that the user can select based on their specific security
needs. This chapter will establish the necessary background information to place this
work in the context of ongoing research in network communications and security.
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2.2 Security Paradigms
There are three primary components of security generally considered in practice
and in the literature - namely the CIA triad. There are also three associated compo-
nents of attack, or threats which an adversary may attempt to employ. The security
needs or requirements of organizations or individual end users of communication ser-
vices may vary significantly. These specific needs can be evaluated by which aspects of
the CIA triad they require, as well as the specific vulnerabilities their communication
system faces. The relationship between these needs and the specific security provi-
sions of a given communication system demonstrates the tunable nature of security:
a system which might be considered secure for one user, may be entirely unacceptable
for another.
2.2.1 CIA Triad
The CIA Triad presents key aspects that a customer/consumer needs to consider,
namely
1. Confidentiality – requires that only the sender and intended recipient(s) can
correctly decode/decrypt the transmitted information.
2. Integrity – requires that the information received is correct and not modified in
any way, shape, or form.
3. Availability – requires that the information arrives within a certain time/latency
window. This is typically quantified using traditional Quality of Service (QoS)
metrics.
The specific CIA requirements, which may vary from person to person, or operation
to operation, dictate the balance of characteristics that a security service might need
to provide, and hence the level and type of security required.
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2.2.2 Transmission Threats
Just as CIA requirements vary from person to person or system to system, so
too are the vulnerabilities to the various attacks. Each of the three following attacks
affects the aspects of the CIA triad differently. Using the classic computer security
model, Alice and Bob represent the “good” sender and receiver entities, while Eve is
the adversary, as used in [4] and [5]. The figures for these three transmission threats
are from [3]
1. Interception
An interception, or eavesdropping, attack refers to the act of passively accessing
communications between two parties [4]. This violates the confidentiality of the
transmission. These attacks can be challenging to identify because the recipient
will still receive the communications and may have no way in which to discover
the interception.
Figure 1. Eavesdrop Attack
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2. Jamming
A jamming attack is a form of denial of service attack. In this attack, Eve
attempts to prevent Bob from receiving the communication from Alice. This
attack is observable because unless Eve can also send alternate data, as in the
Man in the Middle attack, Bob will know he is not receiving the communica-
tions.
Figure 2. Jamming Attack
3. Man in the Middle (MitM)
A MitM attack is similar to the Interception attack. However, in this scenario
Eve injects, removes, or otherwise modifies the intercepted transmission, and
then transmits the modified message to Bob.
These attacks are particularly dangerous to Bob because if the attack is not
identified, Bob will assume the information he receives is how Alice intended it
to be.
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Figure 3. Man in the Middle Attack
2.2.3 Tunable Security
The concept of tunable security stems from the continuously changing nature of
security. Whether or not a given system is secure is determined at run-time by an
end-user. This implies that security can have different meanings for different tasks
or at different times. The CIA triad refers to three main “security” requirements;
yet defining the “security” of a task requires an analysis of the end-user’s goals.
[6] states how many services ”only provide one security configuration at run-time”,
preventing the user from any decisions regarding a performance security trade-off.
The conceptual model the author provides is shown below in Equation 1
TS : T × E → S (1)
Lundin equates tunable security to a function of the Tuner Preferences (T ), set by
the user; the environmental features such as QoS parameters, the ability to encrypt,
or an adversary’s access to the channel; (E). This particular, tuned, configuration
maps to a given security level S. This concept of tunable security as a function of
user preferences and services will be utilized in future work to describe the specific
security provided by a multi-channel communication system’s configuration.
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2.3 Multi-Channel Communication
Multi-channel communication systems utilize sets of communication links to pro-
vide greater diversity in transmission mediums. The use of multiple channels can in-
crease the confidentiality of a message by ensuring the entire message is not sent over
a given link. This ensures that an adversary with access to one or more channels can-
not determine an entire transmission’s contents. Multiple channels can also improve
integrity or availability by providing redundancy. A single channel relies primarily
on encryption to secure its transmissions. However, if an adversary compromises
that particular channel and is able to obtain the key, the transmission is unsecure.
Wolfe et al. describe in [3] how transmitting information across two, distinct chan-
nels can allow the end user to achieve better CIA attributes than a corresponding
single channel system. Dolev et al. prove that one can attain perfect secrecy and
perfect resilience if there are a sufficient number of “wires”, or channels, between the
sender and the receiver. This implies that there exists a tradespace between the single
channel system and the multi-channel system proven by Dolev, where the end user
can achieve better security by increasing their number of channels. As the number of
channels increases, there would be a corresponding increase in cost, along with the
increase in security. This provides an end user the ability to determine what costs
they are willing to incur for their given security requirements and use case.
2.3.1 Perfectly Secure Message Transmission
The Perfectly Secure Message Transmission (PSMT) problem was formalized in
[7], which proposed an answer to the following problem: given a Sender and a Re-
ceiver, does a method exist whereby the sender can transmit a message m while
satisfying the two conditions below:
Perfect Secrecy - For all sets L of at most σ wires, no listening adversary AL
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listening to all wires of L, learns anything about m.
Perfect Resiliency - For all sets D of at most ρ wires, the Receiver correctly
learns m, regardless of the disrupting adversary AD controlling and coordinating
the behavior of the wires in D.
The authors assert that those two conditions can be met using a three phase
protocol, FastSMT, which identifies compromised or faulty wires in phases 1 and 2,
and utilizes phase 3 to transmit the secure message. Dolev’s work implies that a
multi-channel communication system can provide guaranteed secrecy and resiliency,
even with adversarial action, provided there are sufficient channels. It is a simple
extension then, that if there exist fewer channels, those guarantees transform into
probabilities, specifically when L > σ and D > ρ. The exact probability depends on
the structure and contents of the transmitted data. This insight serves as a primary
motivation for the development and use of multi-channel communications.
2.3.2 Cost-Performance Trade-Offs
Communication security research has traditionally focused on single-channel trans-
missions. I.e., there exists a single channel carrying data that may or may not be
encrypted. Wolfe et al. provided an interesting exploration into the services pro-
vided by a two channel system, hinting at the potential for more channels. Dolev et
al. demonstrate and proved that given enough wires (or channels), a communication
system can provide perfect secrecy and perfect resilience. Thus, there must be a
trade-space between a single channel, and Dolev’s n channels, that can provide more
security to the user, at the cost of performance.
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2.4 Implementation/Security Mechanisms
Assuming one could identify security requirements, and establish an approach
to handle multiple channels, the next logical concern would be how to implement
it in a meaningful way within the existing ecosphere of communication systems. A
multi-channel security system, by definition, includes more than one channel, hence
it would likely be handled above the data link layer in a network stack. It may be
a common service, suggesting that it should be handled below the application layer.
Which layer to assign it to is an open question. This research proposes to place it
at the transport layer, perhaps by inclusion in the popular Transport Layer Security
(TLS), which is also at the transport layer. This would allow existing applications
to utilize this system without changes. Additionally, this would allow for reliabil-
ity guarantees provided by the lower layers, such as Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP)’s guaranteed delivery and error detection at both the network and data link
layers.
2.4.1 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.0, specified in January of 1999 in Request for
Comment (RFC) 2246, provides communications privacy throughout the Internet.
It “allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to
prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery” [8]. Operationally, TLS is a
widely used method employed to protect communications. RFC 2246 specifies the
four goals of the TLS Protocol, in order of their priority, [8]:
1. Crytographic security: TLS should be used to establish a secure connection
between two parties.
2. Interoperability: Independent programmers should be able to develop applica-
14
tions using TLS that will then be able to successfully exchange cryptographic
parameters without knowledge of one another’s code.
3. Extensibility: TLS seeks to provide a framework into which new public key and
bulk encryption methods can be incorporated as necessary.
4. Relative efficiency: Cryptographic operations tend to be highly CPU intensive,
particularly public key operations. For this reason, the TLS protocol has incor-
porated an optional session caching scheme to reduce the number of connections
that need to be established from scratch.
To achieve the goals stated above, TLS relies on the TLS Record Protocol to
provide connection security, and TLS Handshake Protocol to authenticate the two
parties. TLS Record Protocol client specifications provide for two basic properties
[8]:
• Private connections. Symmetric cryptography is used for data encryption. The
keys for this symmetric encryption are generated uniquely for each connection
and are based on a secret negotiated by another protocol (such as the TLS
Handshake Protocol).
• Reliable connections. Message transport includes a message integrity check
using a keyed MAC.
The TLS Record Protocol allows the encapsulation of various higher level proto-
cols. One of these protocols is the TLS Handshake Protocol, which provides the user
guarantees of authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The use of a
multi-channel protocol could accomplish these same goals, perhaps better, if properly
designed, implemented, and deployed. Some of the specific approaches which could
be used will be described in Chapter III.
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2.4.1.1 Deprecation of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL):
Transport Layer Security (TLS) became the de facto system for securing transport
layer communications after the deprecation of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) described in
RFC 7568 [9]. SSL version 3, described in RFC 6101 was attacked over years in both
its key exchange mechanism, and its supported cipher suites. For this reason, TLS
1.0 and 1.1, specified in RFC 2246 and 4346 respectively, was created. However, there
was not widespread support of these replacement protocols, which allowed continued
use of SSLv3 [9].
Starting with RFC 5246, TLS removed backwards compatibility with SSL. This
ensured that no TLS sessions would allow the negotiation and use of SSL security.
RFC 7568 states that “SSLv3 Is Comprehensively Broken”. SSL has flaws in
both its Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) modes, as well as a weakness of its stream
ciphers. Its key exchange is vulnerable to Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks through
two specified methods: renegotiation or session resumption. Its hashing functions rely
on SHA-1 and MD5, which are considered weak and are being replaced with stronger
hash functions [9]. TLS addresses each of these weaknesses and fixes them with newly
researched cryptographic methods and features. RFC 7568 states that SSL must not
be used, indicating a complete shift to TLS.
2.4.1.2 TLS Development:
TLS 1.0, first defined in 1999 in [8], did not indicate significant shifts from SSL.
Specifically, it allowed for the negotiation of an SSL connection. The first major shift,
made to secure several vulnerabilities to SSL, was made with TLS 1.1. These changes
are summarized in [10]:
• Replacement of the implicit Initialization Vector (IV) with an explicit IV for
protection against CBC attacks
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• Changed handling of padding errors to protect against CBC attacks
The principal goals and properties of the TLS protocol remain the same from TLS
1.0-1.2. However, [11] includes a large list of changes from TLS 1.1. It allows for
improved flexibility, specifically for the negotiation of cryptographic algorithms and
the specification of cipher suite specific pseudorandom functions. There is support
for authenticated encryption and additional data modes. TLS 1.2 removes support
for certain cipher suites, such as IDEA and DES. And finally, TLS 1.2 lowers the
support for SSLv2 backwards-compatibility from a “SHOULD” to a “MAY”, with
the assumption that it will become a “SHOULD NOT” in the future [11].
As the security environment continued to develop, written standards were needed
to ensure that entities communicate security parameters using the same language to
ensure clarity and efficient communication. These guidelines were specified in RFC
3552, “The Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations” [12]. TLS
1.3 contains both security updates from version 1.2, and a change in the goals of the
TLS protocol to align with the language specifications in RFC 3552. The updated
goals are listed in [13]:
• Authentication: The server side of the channel is always authenticated; the
client side is optionally authenticated. Authentication can happen via asym-
metric cryptography...or a symmetric pre-shared key (PSK).
• Confidentiality: Data sent over the channel after establishment is only visible to
the endpoints. TLS does not natively hide the length of the data it transmits,
though endpoints are able to pad TLS records in order to obscure lengths and
improve protection against traffic analysis techniques.
• Integrity: Data sent over the channel after establishment cannot be modified
by attackers without detection.
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The major changes enumerated in TLS 1.3 reflect significant research in the field
of secure communications [13]. It modifies the cipher suite concept to separate the
authentication and key exchange mechanisms from the record protection algorithm.
It prunes the list of allowable cipher suites to remove legacy algorithms, and removes
static RSA and Diffie-Hellman cipher suites, instead only allowing public-key based
mechanisms which provide forward secrecy - the assurance of past sessions’ secrecy,
even if future sessions are compromised. It requires handshake messages to be en-
crypted, and restructures the handshake state machine to be more consistent and
remove overhead.
TLS 1.0 started as a response to the vulnerabilities in the SSL system, and has
adapted to the now current TLS 1.3 as new vulnerabilities and capabilities have ma-
tured. This pattern demonstrates a willingness to adapt to an ever-changing security
environment to develop new methods and protocols to maintain secure communica-
tions. This pattern should continue with the support of multi-channel communica-
tions in the years to come.
2.4.2 Message Authentication Codes
Receivers of any given security protocol need the capability to determine message
integrity. At the minimum, this allows a system to determine whether or not messages
have been altered in transit, whether by channel degradation or adversarial action.
This section outlines two popular form of MACs - the CRC which provides error
detection, and the RS Code which provides error correction.
2.4.2.1 Cyclic Redundancy Codes
Simple error detection relies on appending some bit or bits of overhead to a data
packet. This overhead represents a “checksum” of the data to be transmitted. Com-
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monly used examples of this are an XOR, two’s complement addition, and a CRC.
For purposes of this thesis, we will be using a 32-bit CRC for error detection.
A CRC utilizes polynomial division to compute a Frame Check Sequence (FCS)
value representing the data. The sender uses polynomial division to divide the data
by the CRCs’s initializing polynomial. When the division is complete, the remainder
(extended out to 32 bits) is appended to the data, and transmitted across a channel.
The receiver computes the same value on the received data. If the corresponding
output is 0, it indicates that the data was sent without error [14]. The strength of the
CRC relies upon the polynomial chosen for the initialization, leading to the concept of
a “weak” versus a “strong” CRC. Many commonly utilized polynomials are explored
extensively by Koopman in [15] and updated results can be found at [16].
CRCs provide no error correction. Thus, they are commonly used in communi-
cations where retransmission is preferential to the increased overhead/computation
required to correct transmission errors. Despite their strong ability to detect errors
in transmission, they do not provide protection against MITM attacks. Because the
initializing polynomial is assumed to be public, an adversary with access to a given
channel can modify information, recalculate the CRC, and then transmit the new
packet to the destination. The receiver will calculate the CRC based on the informa-
tion it received, and it will be accepted. Thus, a CRC alone is not a good enough
defense against MITM attacks.
2.4.2.2 Reed-Solomon Codes
RS codes are one of the first error correcting codes, proposed by Reed and Solomon
in [17]. They have widespread use in many digital communication and storage appli-
cations. Figure 4 shows the structure of a Reed-Solomon data packet.
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Figure 4. Reed-Solomon Structure
Given a symbol size s bits, the maximum length of a given RS codeword is n =
2s − 1 bytes. Given an n byte packet, there are k data bytes, with n − k = 2 · t
bytes of overhead. Given the properties of RS codes, this can correct errors in up to
t bytes. As shown in [18], a popular RS code is RS(255, 223), with s = 8. This gives
the following data values: n = 28 − 1 = 255, k = 223, 2 · t = 32. Thus, with 32 bytes
of overhead, per 223 bytes of data, the RS code can correct errors in up to 16 data
bytes, with a maximum number of errors of 16 · 8 = 128 bit errors.
2.4.3 Encryption
Encryption is a branch of Cryptography, “the science of secret writing with the
goal of hiding the meaning of a message” [5]. The goal is to obfuscate the meaning of
a message, so that even if an adversary has access to a transmission’s contents, the
meaning is hidden: the message appears to be a random collection of bits. To be a
successful cryptosystem, it should follow Kerckhoffs’ Principle:
Kerckhoffs’ Principle: A cryptosystem should be secure even if the
attacker (Oscar) knows all details about the system, with the exception
of the secret key. In particular, the system should be secure when the
attacker knows the encryption and decryption algorithms.
Figure 5 below shows how encryption would prevent a simple eavesdropping at-
tack:
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Figure 5. Blocking an Eavesdropping Attack Through Encryption
By encrypting the message through the use of some secure key k, and some en-
cryption/decryption function (e() and d()), Eve intercepts y, that has no apparent
relation to the original message x.
At a very simplistic level, encryption relies on the scrambling of the data. If one
disregards message padding, each bit of input (or block of input) correlates directly
to a block of output in the ciphertext. Its security relies on the low probability of
an adversary decrypting the contents in a reasonable time period. Most modern
cryptographic systems rely on the mathematical challenge of factoring a very large
number into its associated primes. As processing technology develops, they simply
shift to larger and larger primes. However, eventually these technologies will be less
effective. One example of a technology that would render this encryption obsolete is
the finished development of the quantum computer. Thus, a future time is anticipated
where security must be maintained through methods which do not rely on traditional
encryption.
2.4.4 Data Fragmentation
The use of a multi-channel communication system presents the opportunity to
fragment a message into unique, discrete fragments, and then distribute those frag-
ments across the available channels. While there may be many methods to fragment
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the message, ranging from deterministic splitting to elaborate functions, an efficient
and ideally a cryptographically secure method can provide significant obfuscation
without excessive overhead. This cryptographic security implies that an adversary
cannot predict future outputs by observing and recording past outputs. A Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) provides an elegant way of realizing long, pseudo-
random sequences with minimal software/hardware requirements, making it an ideal
candidate for data fragmentation. A LFSR consists of a series of flip flops and a
feedback path. Figure 6 shows a simple LFSR consisting of three flip flops, with a
feedback path consisting of the output of FF1 and FF0, as described in [5]. The
LFSR outputs a single bit s after each clock cycle.
s2
FF2 FF1
s1
FF0
s0
clk
si ... s1, s0
Figure 6. Simple LFSR
Given an m-bit LFSR, the maximum output length is shown below [5]:
Length = 2m − 1 (2)
After 2m − 1 values, the sequence will repeat itself, this length is the LFSR’s period.
Because of the linear progression of its internal state, the LFSR’s sequence can be
broken with 2 ·m [5].
This leads to the Trivium cipher. Trivium is a “hardware oriented synchronous
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stream cipher” [19]. By chaining together three LFSRs, the internal state of each
LFSR does not evolve in a linear fashion. Figure 7 shows the internal structure of
the Trivium stream cipher [19], where sn indicates the n
th bit of state, and zi is the
ith bit of output. This construction gives the Trivium cipher a period of 264 bits.
Figure 7. Trivium Internal State
This cipher’s simple construction allows for low power implementations in hard-
ware, while providing cryptograpically secure outputs.
23
2.4.5 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
As mentioned in 2.4.3, the most important aspect of a cryptosystem is the key.
Thus, a secure method must be utilized to exchange the initialization parameters
for the system over an insecure channel. The Trivium cipher requires 160 bits of
information to initialize the system. If a sender and receiver must utilize Trivium in
a synchronized fashion, they require the exchange of that initialization information
– a key exchange. The DHKE algorithm is a one-way function that relies on the
commutative property of exponentiation. This algorithm has two phases - a setup
and the exchange [5].
Algorithm 1 DHKE Setup
Choose a large prime p
Choose an integer α ∈ {2, 3, ..., p− 2}
Publish p and α
Once the public parameters p and α are published, both Alice and Bob do the
following operation (shown for Alice)
Algorithm 2 DHKE Exchange
Choose a = kpriv,A ∈ 2, ..., p− 2
Compute A = kpub,A ≡ αa mod p
Send A to Bob, and receive B = kpub,B from Bob
Both Alice and Bob can compute the key KAB using the following operation:
kAB = (kpub,B)
k
priv,A ≡ Ba mod p (3)
The proof of this key exchange’s validity stems from the exponentiation utilized:
DHKE Proof: Alice computes the following:
kAB = B
a ≡ (αb)a ≡ αab mod p
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Bob computes the following:
kAB = A
b ≡ (αa)b ≡ αba mod p
Thus, both Alice and Bob share the session key kAB [5].
This method can be utilized to exchange information for a data fragmentation
scheme. Alice and Bob will both compute a session key kAB, and can utilize the
Most Significant Bits (MSBs) to generate the key and IV for the data fragmentation
scheme.
2.5 Quality of Service (QoS)
Quality of Service is defined as is the “Capability to control traffic-handling mecha-
nisms in the network such that the network meets the service needs of certain applica-
tions and users subject to network policies and strategies” [20]. QoS metrics typically
include bandwidth, packet delay, timing jitter, and packet loss. A customer’s needs
can change, requiring different levels of QoS metrics, and ignoring others.
Providers need to determine methods to provision their services, in order ot sat-
isfy their customers. [21] describes an analytical method to combine services along
different channels of an end-to-end route.
2.6 Regulatory Standards
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) created the Critical In-
frastructure Protection (CIP) security standards CIP-002-014 [22] to formalize the
security requirements for the entire energy sector, ranging from personnel & training
requirements in CIP-004-6 to Information Protection, outlined in CIP-011-2, that
will be the focused standard in this article. The purpose CIP-011-2, is “To prevent
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unauthorized access to BES Cyber System Information by specifying information pro-
tection requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise
that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES)”.
Fries, in [23], references a set of standards created by the International Electrotech-
nical Commission (IEC), specifically IEC 62443-3-3, that states two requirements
directly related to secure communication:
• Requirement 3.3.1 Communication Integrity: “The control system shall provide
the capability to protect the integrity of transmitted information”
• Requirement 4.4.1 Communication confidentiality: “The control system shall
provide the capability to protect the confidentiality of information at rest and
remote access session traversing an untrusted network”
2.7 Summary
There is clearly a vested interest in developing mechanisms to guarantee the con-
fidentiality and integrity of communications, specifically in the field of critical infras-
tructure. There are regulatory standards that dictate the requirements for secure
communications. An understanding of the interaction between operational CIA re-
quirements and possible attack vulnerabilities allow the user to determine their own,
unique security requirements. Given these security requirements, a communication
system ought to provide the ability to meet those requirements efficiently. One of
the primary methods securing networked communications currently is TLS. The TLS
protocol allows a sender and receiver to negotiate a specific security configuration,
demonstrating tunability. TLS has gone through several iterations to reflect the
changing needs of the security environment, reflected in the three main goals of TLS
1.3: authentication, confidentiality, and integrity.
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Security research traditionally has only focused on the security of individual chan-
nels. A given channel has its own security attributes and threats, but the relationship
between channels has not been widely studied. Wolfe et al. investigated a two channel
system, while Dolev et al. theorized about the merits of an n channel system. This
work will investigate the area between those two works - multi-channel communica-
tions. This work proposes a data fragmentation scheme based on the existing Trivium
cipher, which will be utilized to distribute a message’s contents across the available
channels. The remainder of this thesis develops a common terminology to describe a
multi-channel communication system using data fragmentation. This theory leads to
an investigation into the theoretical benefits of a multi-channel protocol, and a proof
of concept design which demonstrates the challenges to its implementation, and the
security services gained through its use.
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III. Multi-Channel Communication Terminology and
Theory
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the terminology and theory required for the discussion of a
multi-channel communication system. and which informs the proof of concept design
and the creation of a specific protocol to allow for precise communication of session
parameters. Additionally, this enables description of the primary motivations for
the use of a multi-channel protocol, independent of specific design decisions. These
motivations are firstly the resilience of this protocol against adversarial action, and
secondly the tunable security it provides to a user.
3.2 Multi-Channel Theory
This section will establish the relationships and terms required for the discussion
of a multi-channel protocol. Additionally, these relationships will be applied to an
example message transmission to demonstrate their reliability.
3.2.1 Terminology
Assume a user wants to send message M , with |M | = m. This message is broken
into a set of k fragments FM , satisfying the following relationships:
FM = {f1, f2, f3, ..., fk}
fi ⊆M for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
f1 6⊆ f2 6⊆ ... 6⊆ fk Each fragment is unique
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The Fragmentation Factor (FFM) will indicate the fragmentation level of the message.
This metric is simply the number of fragments which compose M .
FFM = k
A high fragmentation factor indicates a higher tunability for the end user because
there are simply more ways to distribute the message fragments across the available
channels. Let C be the set of n available channels.
C = {C1, C2, C3, ..., Cn}
Cj ⊆ FM for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
This allows the calculation of the channel load, which indicates the percentage of
M present on a given channel.
Lj =
∑ |f | for f ∈ Cj
m
The Average Channel Load (ACL) presents the expected percentage of M transmitted
on any given channel, and is the average of Lj for all channels:
ACLM = Average(Lj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
The ACL increases as the user decides to utilize duplication. This leads to two
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important items for consideration:
1. How many times the user transmits a given fragment. This matters because
this is a measure of the reliability/redundancy of the system. If fragment f1
is transmitted five times, but f2 is only transmitted once - then the loss of
f2 results in the inability to recreate the message. This metric is simply the
Count(fi), indicating the number of times that fi occurs across all the channels
in C. The minimum Count(f) for f ∈ FM indicates the minimum number
of channels required for an adversary to prevent the successful receipt of the
message.
2. An important consideration for efficiency is the overhead of transmitted data.
i.e., how much message data is being sent, relative to the size of M . This is the
Spatial/Static Duplication Factor (SDF)
SDF (M) =
Count(fi) · |fi| for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
|M | − 1 (4)
Equation 4 quantifies the amount of duplication the user transmits. SDF (M) =
0 indicates that there is no duplicate information, while SDF (M) = n − 1
indicates that each channel carries an entire copy of the message.
The construction of the equations and relationships in this section allow for larger
analysis of a multi-channel protocol which transmits multiple messages, as well as
fragmentation into unique-sized fragments.
3.2.2 Example Transmission:
This section will step through the transmission of a single message to demonstrate
how the metrics described above can be applied. Note that this uses a fragmentation
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scheme which presents unequal sized fragments to better illustrate the insights these
metrics provide.
Parameters.
Let M be a message of size m, with n = 3 channels, and |F | = 3.
The following relationships describe the fragmentation scheme and the mapping of
the individual message fragments:
F = {f1, f2, f3}
|f1| = 5 ·m
7
, and |f2| = |f3| = m
7
C1 = {f1}, C2 = {f1}, C3 = {f2, f3}
Channel Load.
The following calculations demonstrate the load on each channel:
L1 =
5·m
7
m
=
5
7
L2 =
5·m
7
m
=
5
7
L3 =
m
7
+ m
7
m
=
2
7
This gives:
ACLM =
5
7
+ 5
7
+ 2
7
3
=
4
7
= 0.57
This result indicates that the average channel transmits 57% of the message, which
accounts for both Channels 1 and 2 sending a higher percentage of the message.
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Duplication Factors.
First, obtain a count of each fragment:
Count(f1) = 2 Count(f2) = 1 Count(f3) = 1
Because the minimum fragment count is 1, if either f2 or f3 is lost/damaged, the
message cannot be recreated.
The final calculation is the SDF based on size of the fragments:
SDF =
2 · 5m
7
+ 1 · m
7
+ 1 · m
7
m
− 1
=
12·m
7
m
− 1
=
12
7
− 1 = 1.714− 1 = 0.714
This result indicates that there was actually a total of 71% of additional information
transmitted.
The relationships described in this section will allow the end user to quantify
the performance of their system relative to standard QoS metrics. Optimally, the
end user ought to be able to prioritize high bandwidth, secure channels by assigning
them more message fragments. The equations and relationships developed allow for
the analysis of unique channels, carrying different sized message fragments, across
multiple message transmissions.
3.3 Duplication Considerations
One important consideration for a multi-channel architecture is the ability to
transmit duplicate information to facilitate the recovery of lost or damaged informa-
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tion. The amount of duplication presents a tunable parameter that can be set by
the user to meet their specific security requirements. Any duplication produces an
increased risk to confidentiality because an adversary can obtain a larger share of
the message by intercepting or listening to a given channel. However, it also pro-
vides the user an increased guarantee of integrity and availability because there exist
multiple copies of the same data. This highlights a fundamental trade-off between
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
By limiting the user to the strict duplication of information, there is a finite range
of values an end user can utilize. The minimum value would be no duplication,
SDFM = 0. This would indicate that each channel carries unique information, and
the user requires all channels’ information to re-assemble the message. Alternatively,
the user can send a full copy of the message on each available channel, SDFM = n−1.
These two extremes indicate the maximum and minimum levels of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability available to the end user. The area between these extremes
represents the system’s tunability for the end user.
3.4 Theoretical Multi-Channel Framework
This section will outline the operation and benefit of a multi-channel commu-
nication framework, independent of specific design decisions, using the traditional
cyber security characters of Alice, Bob, and Eve.1 This will identify the benefits of a
generic multi-channel protocol which allows for the fragmentation and duplication of
data, using the previous terminology. This will establish what is possible using such
a protocol, and provide a comparison for the design decisions made in the proof of
concept system. The concept of a channel is intentionally vague. A channel could
simply utilize a unique port from other channels, but could also indicate a physically
1When referring to “best” and “worst” case, this will be from the perspective of Alice and Bob,
not Eve.
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distinct system. The security services, specifically the resilience to adversarial action,
considered in this chapter are independent of those design decisions. The specific
definition of a “channel” only affects the probability of an adversary observing or af-
fecting the channel’s transmission. For example, if a system utilized a single Ethernet
line with different TCP/User Datagram Protocol (UDP) ports for each “channel”; an
adversary could observe each channel if it compromises the ethernet line.
3.4.1 Resilience to Adversarial Action
Traditional security measures rely heavily on the use of encryption to protect data
and sensitive information. Encryption, in turn, relies entirely on the protection of a
key. If an adversary has access to a communication channel, they theoretically have
the capability to decrypt and decode the message, given enough time or computing
resources. This protocol aims to provide increased security by allowing the user to
not transmit the entire message across a given communication channel, leaving the
attacking without portions of the data stream, assuming the attacker does not have
access to each of the channels employed. Three examples illustrate the protocols’
resilience against an interception attack, a jamming attack, and a MITM attack.
3.4.1.1 Interception Attack
Consider a communication session between a sender, Alice, and a receiver, Bob.
Alice wants to send a message to Bob while providing a guarantee of Confidentiality.
Let there be n = 3 channels between Alice and Bob, Channels = {C1, C2, C3}; and
a listening adversary Eve, who listens to the set of channels L, with 1 ≤ L ≤ n, and
knows the total message length m. The communications between Alice and Bob will
be fragmented at the bit level using a cryptographically secure splitting mechanism.
The length of the data sent on each channel is |C1| = |C2| = |C3| = m3 . We will now
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investigate the best and worst case scenario for this adversarial setup.
1. Single Channel Interception: |L| = 1
Eve, the listening adversary has access to exactly 1
3
of the data sent, let L = C1.
If the message had simply been divided into thirds and sent, this could repre-
sent a significant amount of information leakage, with leakage being some com-
bination of interception, decoding, and decryption. The adversary has already
accomplished two of those three tasks: they intercepted information, and it was
never encrypted, so the information they have is actual data from the original
message. Because the protocol split the message data at the bit level, this en-
sures that the adversary does not know which bits they have. This indicates
that the challenge for the adversary lies in the decoding of the message bits
they intercepted. To decode the entire message, the adversary needs to place
the m bits correctly.
The worst case scenario would occur if Eve knows the placement of C1 - knowing
which bits of M were assigned to C1. From there, Eve would be forced to guess
the value of the remaining 2·m
3
bits. With equal probabilities for each bit, this
gives the following:
P (decode) = (
1
2
)
2·m
3
The best case scenario would occur if Eve was unsure of the placement of C1.
This would cause a corresponding decrease in P (decode) because in addition to
guessing the values of the bits assigned to C2 and C3, Eve must also guess their
placement to recreate M .
2. Three Channel Interception: |L| = 3 = |C|
This assumes Eve has access to all of the data, unencrypted. The worst case
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scenario would still be if Eve knows the placement of the message bits. This
would lead to a successful interception/eavesdropping, with Eve learning the
message’s contents. The best case scenario would occur if Eve does not know
the placement of the bits, which would require properly placing all m bits into
their proper locations. Even though Eve knows the contents, this would not be
trivial.
One can clearly see the security benefits of a fragmenting or splitting protocol. Even
in the presence of an adversary with access to the original, unencrypted data, the
adversary still requires an almost brute-force search to decode the information into
its meaningful components when only intercepting a partial message. Eve must know
the session key used to map each data bit to its corresponding fragment and channel
to gain meaningful information.
3.4.1.2 Jamming Attack
Another benefit of this protocol is the resiliency to a jamming attack. Consider
again a communication session between Alice and Bob. Alice wants to send a message
to Bob while providing a guarantee of Integrity, indicating that Alice will duplicate
information. Let the message M be split at the bit level into three message fragments
f1, f2, and f3.
2. Let there be n = 3 channels between Alice and Bob, Channels =
{C1, C2, C3}, with the following fragment structure: C1 → {f1, f2}, C2 → {f2, f3},
C3 → {f1, f3}. The length of the data sent on each channel is |C1| = |C2| = |C3| =
2·m
3
.
2These fragments will be assumed to have identical sizes
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Using the equations developed in Section 3.2.1, we derive the following values:
L1 = L2 = L3 =
2
3
ACLM =
2
3
Count(f1) = Count(f2) = Count(f3) = 2
SDFM =
2 · m
3
+ 2 · m
3
+ 2 · m
3
m
− 1 = 1
Now consider a jamming adversary Eve, with the capability to jam C1. Despite
the presence of jamming on the particular channel, Bob can recreate the message using
only the fragments transmitted on C2 and C3. This can also be seen by investigating
the values of the fragment counts, or the SDFM : because all fragments occur twice,
a single deletion cannot prevent the full message from being received; however, the
calculation of SDFM = 1 indicates Alice transmitted 100% of additional data to
secure the transmission against a jamming adversary, which represents a significant
bandwidth cost.
Consider a similar, 10 channel scenario, with the same fragmentation scheme (frag-
ments comprising f1 − f10 instead of f1 − f3). This gives the following relationships:
L1 = L2 = L3 = ... = L10 = ACLM =
2
10
Count(f1) = Count(f2) = Count(f3) = ... = Count(f10) = 2
SDFM = 2− 1 = 1
In the worst case, the message can be lost if an Eve jams two channels sharing
the same message fragment. However, Eve must correctly guess which channels to
jam, a probability of 2
9
. In the best case, Alice and Bob could lose 5 channels, and
still properly receive the message using the fragments on the remaining 5 channels.
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This can lead to the following relationship regarding the resiliency of the multi
channel architecture to a jamming attack, specifically the minimum and maximum
number of channels needed to either destroy or recreate the message. The minimum
number of channels required for Eve to destroy the message equals the minimum
Count(f) for f ∈ FM ; however, Eve can guarantee message destruction by com-
promising x > |FM |
Avg.Count(M)
channels. Thus, for the 10 channel scenario, Eve can
destroy M by compromising 2 channels, and can guarantee success by compromising
6 channels. The minimum number of channels needed to recreate the message is
|FM |
Avg.Count(M)
: a single copy of each fragment must be received. However, Alice and
Bob can guarantee successful receipt as long as Bob receives > n −Min.Count(M)
channels’ transmissions. Thus, for this transmission scenario, Bob can decode M from
5 channels, and can guarantee success by receiving 9 channels.
3.4.1.3 Man in the Middle Attack
Typically, if an adversary conducts a MITM attack successfully, the recipient is
unaware of the presence of the attack upon receipt. There are several protections
which this architecture provides to a MITM attack, as well as several features which
provide added utility to the end users.
Assume again that Alice wants to send a message to Bob, and that Eve will be
attempting a MITM attack. We start with the message M , and append some form
of Message Authentication Code. Thus, Alice will distribute Data = M +MACM to
the available channels, which distributes both the message bits and message MAC.
Each channel will then append a channel-specific MAC to its transmission. We will
again assume three channels, C1, C2, C3, and three fragments f1, f2, f3.
The first scenario is that with no duplication, SDFM = 0: C1 = {f1}, C2 =
{f2}, C3 = {f3}. Let Eve modify C1 = f1 → f ′1, to include the modification of the
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channel MAC to ensure Bob will accept the channel contents upon receipt. Thus,
when Bob attempts to recombine f ′1, f2, and f3 into M , the recombined message will
have an incorrect Message Authentication Code, and will fail. However, Bob will
not know which channel caused the error. As shown in Section 2.2.2, these types of
attacks can be severely harmful. Thus, even with no information duplication, this
architecture provides a baseline of resilience against a MITM attack by detecting
the attack while recombining the message, even if the receiver initially accepts the
modified message fragment.
The second scenario is that with a SDFM = 1: C1 = {f1, f2}, C2 = {f2, f3}, C3 =
{f1, f3} Let Eve modify C1 = {f1, f2} → {f ′1, f ′2}. When Bob attempts to recombine
the fragments into M , the recombined message will have an incorrect MAC, and
thus will fail. However, now because of duplication, Bob can attempt to recreate the
message only using the fragments transmitted on C1 and C2, which will fail; C1 and
C3, which will fail; and finally C2 and C3, which will succeed, with no additional
transmissions. Because he was successfully able to recombine the message from those
two channels, Bob can identify that the error was caused on C1, and adjust his
transmission posture appropriately.
Both of the above scenarios demonstrate the effectiveness of this architecture to
detect injection attacks which were previously unidentifiable. However, as shown
in Scenario #2, through duplication, the receiver can determine which channel is
compromised, while still recovering the original message without retransmission. It
must be noted that, with duplication, Eve can leverage the duplicate information to
decode the transmitted message. To mitigate this threat, additional entropy might
need to be added to address this weakness.
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3.5 Fragmentation/Splitting Tunability
With regards to the fragmentation of the message, the duplication, and the number
of channels, it is clear to see the relationship between them, and the limits that
imposes on the tunability of the system. The user does not have the ability to set all
three aspects independently. However, the user may select any values for two of the
three “tunable” factors, and that selection drives the third.
This requires that we analyze the bounds of the three terms, and see how those
limits affect the overall system.
3.5.1 Bounds
The channel load indicates the percentage of M that is transmitted on a given
channel. The lower bound for this is that Lch > 0. If Lch = 0, this indicates that
none of the message M was sent over the channel, which would remove it from the
set of utilized channels. The upper bound is also easy to determine, and it occurs
when a given channel sends the entire message M , giving Lch = 1.
The lower bound for the spatial duplication factor indicates the scenario when none
of the message is duplicated. Thus, every fragment of the message is sent once, giving
a total SDFM = 1− 1 = 0. The upper bound for the duplication would occur when
every channel sends the entire message. Thus, the upper bound is SDFM = n− 1.
The number of channels has no upper bound; however, n must be greater than or
equal to 1. If n = 0, there would be no connection between sender and receiver.
Term Bounds
Channel Load 0 < Lch ≤ 1
Spatial Duplication Factor 0 ≤ SDF ≤ n− 1
# Channels 1 ≤ n ≤ ∞
Table 1. Fragmentation Bounds
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3.6 Tunability
The three terms bounded above illustrate some of the tunable characteristics for
different aspects of a theoretical system: the Channel Load applies to a given channel,
the Spatial Duplication Factor applies to a given message, and the number of channels
applies to a given session. By investigating the causes for each value’s maximum and
minimums, one can see that the selections of certain parameters drives the result of
others. For example, by setting the Channel Load to its maximum value of 1, it
drives the Spatial Duplication Factor to its maximum of n − 1, independent of the
number of channels. By setting the number of channels and the SDF , it determines
the required Channel Load. Thus, the end user would be able to set values according
to the specific constraints of their use case and security needs.
3.7 Summary
This section defined several important terms and characteristics of a multi-channel,
data fragmenting protocol. These terms need to be established prior to making spe-
cific design decisions to ensure precise communication, and to allow comparison be-
tween various systems with a unified language. A theoretical multi-channel system
was outlined, establishing how a multi-channel protocol can provide resiliency to the
end user, and the bounds of that resiliency given a session’s characteristics. This the-
oretical baseline is independent of specific operational constraints such as the method
of fragmentation, the method of error detection/correction, and the characteristics of
the communication channels. These issues are factored in to specific design decisions
in the creation of the proof of concept system.
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IV. Proof of Concept Design
4.1 Objective
This chapter details the design decisions made in the proof of concept system,
and the transmission scenarios for which it will be evaluated. It outlines the consid-
eration of various tools or languages to be used in the construction of the prototype
system, as well as how to evaluate the performance. A multi-channel system could
be built within an event-based network simulator. This would simulate system use
in a realistic environment, incorporating the concepts of buffering, processing, and
transmission delays into the system’s operation. Additionally, it would ensure each
channel was unique. However, this would have proven more cumbersome than nec-
essary to test the security concepts examined, because a statistical experiment was
not strictly necessary. Packet loss from channel noise and router drop are already
handled at the Transport Layer through TCP’s message delivery guarantees. Use of
a simulator could provide insight into delay or other availability performance param-
eters, but that was not the intent of this effort. Instead, these tests are confirmatory
in nature. Given a transmission scenario - a number of channels, a fragment to chan-
nel mapping, an amount of duplication, and adversarial actions - the outcome ought
to be deterministic. If the protocol operates at the Transport Layer, using existing
protocols such as TCP, the sender is guaranteed that the packet arrives at the des-
tination. At this stage of development there is no need for a stochastic experiment,
and the additional realism of a simulator’s environment would have provided data
that was outside of the scope of this research. Such studies are left for future work.
Although nearly any higher level language could have been used to construct the
system, Python was chosen, allowing a simple approach to simulate network commu-
nications in specific configurations, while ignoring extraneous information. One of the
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primary goals of this system was to demonstrate that the splitting and recombination
elements of the proposed system could function as intended. This indicates the need
for confirmatory test cases, rather than statistical experiments. Given a set of trans-
mission scenarios, the system should identify an affected message, potentially identify
which channels have been compromised, and if duplication allows - reconstruct the
message. Additionally, the amount of information on each channel can be measured,
to calculate the percentage of overhead incurred, verifying the mechanisms function
as desired. Another benefit to this constructing a propotype is learning about the is-
sues in the actual implementation of this system by simulating an end-to-end system.
This end-to-end system must be able to fit into an existing communication security
system which could benefit from its use, as well as adopt its use without significant
changes to existing infrastructure. This rationale led to the investigation into the
TLS protocol, which already allows negotiation between a sender/receiver to identify
“acceptable” security levels for a given communication. As mentioned in Chapter II,
TLS also requires guarantees of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authentication [13].
This dictates the need for a crytographically secure splitting mechanism. Unlike a
simple Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG), which is easily implemented,
a crytographically secure mechanism prevents an adversary from predicting future
message fragments by monitoring the system’s previous outputs.
4.2 Fragmentation and Duplication Considerations
Fragmentation.
The only requirement for the splitting mechanism is that the sender and receiver
need to share the same mechanism, as well as have a method to exchange initialization
information. This indicates that the system can be tuned for specific use cases. Wolfe
et al. in [3] describe how the encryption of a single gigabyte of information requires
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0.41Wh of energy just for the encryption of the data. Similarly, using 128-bit AES
to encrypt a single, 128-bit block of data took a low-power sensor 1.1 milliseconds,
946 bytes of random access memory, and 23.57 microjoules. These amounts can be
detrimental to a device with limited power or memory. Low power devices could
utilize non-crytographically secure methods such as PRNGs, and simply exchange
the seed value. This would enable them to secure their transmissions purely through
the use of different connections, and not require the use of any encryption or cipher
system. However, this would imply that the additional connections incur a lesser cost
than the process of encryption. This depends on the type of connections available
and the provided hardware, and is outside the scope of this work. Devices which
require more robust communications security can utilize more secure stream ciphers
and key exchange mechanisms. This allows the system designer to determine the
overhead they are willing to incur from the splitting mechanism itself, relative to the
specific use case, with the understanding that there exists a relationship between the
specific splitting mechanism used, the amount of overhead required, and the security
it provides given an adversary.
The Trivium cipher was chosen as the basis of the splitting mechanism to assign
each data bit to a specific fragment. This implementation requires 288 bits of internal
state, as well as two, 80 bit numbers to initialize the system. Because it is constructed
of simple LFSRs, the hardware requirements are minimal and could be a suitable
construction for a low-power device which can accomplish the DHKE.
Logical Duplication.
If the duplication of information is limited strictly to bit-level duplication, there is
no method to recover a lost fragment without full duplication of the message informa-
tion (bits). By utilizing logical operations between fragments, it is possible to recover
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lost information with fewer overhead bits than message bits. For example, consider a
3-channel, 3-fragment system. Alice sends information with the following mapping:
C1 = f1, C2 = f2, C3 = f1 ⊕ f2. If any single channel’s information is lost, the full
message can be recovered. This demonstrates a method in which full recovery can
occur with only 50% overhead, or 1 bit of overhead per 2 bits of data. Additionally,
by introducing a link between fragments, there is a significant decrease in entropy of
the transmitted information. The link between f1 and f2 to produce f3 = f1⊕ f2, in-
dicates that an adversary can determine the entire message by intercepting two of the
channels. In order to mitigate this weakness, an additional obfuscating mechanism
such as in [24] could be created. This would prevent an adversary from identifying
the link between bits, however it would cause a significant increase in overhead and
complexity. Logical duplication also provides no allowance for unequal fragment sizes.
In the above example, f1, f2, and f3 must be equal sizes in order to satisfy the logical
relationship. Thus, an adversary knows the length of the transmission must be an
integer multiple of whatever data they intercept.
For these reasons, the proof of concept system only utilizes non-logical duplication.
This requires the user to transmit no fewer than two copies of the data if they wish to
recover from adversarial action on a single channel. This system, in conjunction with
the Trivium splitting mechanism, provides the adversary limited information about
the contents of intercepted channels. By utilizing a probabilistic method to determine
the bit-fragment mapping, each channel can carry different data lengths.
4.3 Proof of Concept Design
The Proof of Concept will use Alice and Bob as the sender and receiver, with
Eve as an adversary. Alice and Bob will utilize the DHKE algorithm to calculate a
session key. The given session key will allow Alice and Bob to extract the required
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information to initialize the splitting mechanism - the Trivium stream cipher - by
using the upper 160 bits from the session key as the 80 bit Trivium key, and 80 bit
initialization vector. Given the number of fragments |FM |, Alice and Bob will output
x = dlog2(|FM |)e bits from the Trivium cipher for each data bit, which will assign
the bit to a specific fragment. Then, each channel carrying the given fragment will
append the data bit to its transmission.
There are two available methods for message authentication. A 32 bit CRC will
be used for error detection. Alternatively, a (245,255) RS code will be used for error
correction, indicating that for every 255 transmitted bytes, 245 bytes are data, and
10 bytes are error correcting information. When using forward error correction, the
CRC will still be used for the message Error Correcting Code (ECC), while each
channel uses the RS code to secure its transmission.
Three notional example messages were used: a text file containing the final six
lines of the poem “Ulysses”, by Alfred, Lord Tennyson; an image of the Maroon Bells
mountains in Colorado; and a text file of “Hamlet”, by William Shakespeare. These
illustrate the measurement of different configurations’ overhead costs. The “Ulysses”
transmission simulates a short transmission of 275 bytes, while the two other messages
simulate longer sessions by using a significantly larger amount of data: 196.83 KB
and 183.86 KB, respectively. To “transmit” a message, Alice will write the channel
contents to channel-specific text files. Eve will be able to read those files, simulating
an eavesdropping attack; will be able to modify those files, simulating a MITM attack;
and will be able to delete any portion of those files, simulating a jamming attack.
Bob will receive the message using the available channel files, and then write the
final output to a separate “received” file. This will document the state of the system
at each step of its operation. However, because the system under evaluation never
actually transmits data, the effects of network traffic, latency, and bandwidth can
46
not be observed and are not studied here. Additionally, while the three attacks
will be analyzed for our system, there will be no experiments concerning the attacks
themselves because their success or failure depends purely on the chosen transmission
scenario, and will not change .
4.3.1 Initialization
The user starts by specifying the following parameters:
• file - file path and name of message file
• crc - mode of operation. True indicates “Wired” mode with no forward er-
ror correction, False indicates “Wireless” mode which conducts forward error
correction.
• silent - Allows the adversary, Eve, to recalculate channel CRCs after modifying
information to prevent the receiver, Bob, from detecting a MITM attack.
Alice and Bob then compute a session key using the DHKE algorithm. They each
extract the top 160 bits of the shared key. The first 80 bits are the trivium key, and the
next 80 bits are the trivium IV. The user defines the number of channels, the number
of fragments, and the Spatial Duplication Factor (SDF). Given the specifications, the
sender program generates a fragment to channel mapping, and the receiver program
generates the same mapping.
4.3.2 Sending
In order to send the file, Alice takes each bit of the message, and assigns it a
fragment identifier, based on the output of the Trivium cipher. That bit is appended
onto each channel which will transmit the corresponding fragment. If a channel has a
complete byte, it updates that channel’s CRC with the value, and stores the output
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byte in the channel output. With each byte of message input, the overall message
CRC updates. Finally, the sender assigns each bit of the message CRC a fragment
identifier in the same manner as the message data bits. Alice then writes the output
to the corresponding channel files, computes the channels’ CRCs or RS codes, and
then appends those values to the channels’ output.
4.3.3 Receiving
Bob begins by assuming each channel is valid. If a file cannot be opened, caused
by a successful jamming attack, that channel is set to invalid. Bob then inspects each
channel’s contents using either the CRC error detection, or RS error correction. If
that shows an error (or cannot correct it in the case of RS), that channel is marked
as invalid. Bob then attempts to recombine the message using the given fragmenta-
tion scheme, and channel mapping. For a given bit, if there are differences between
channels carrying that bit (ie. Channel 1 and 2 both carry bit X, but their contents
differ), that particular fragment is flagged as being modified. After finishing the re-
combination process, Bob checks the message CRC. If the message passes that check,
Bob knows he received the message properly. However, in the event of a failure, the
protocol goes into recovery mode. If the modified fragments can be isolated to a
single channel, it attempts a ”smart recovery” by turning off that channel. If that
succeeds, Bob flags the adversarially-modified channel as being insecure.
If Bob is unable to determine a single modified channel, he attempts to recombine
the message using all combinations of the channel contents which can produce the
entire message, until he discovers the affected channel. Bob will report whether or
not he is able to successfully decode the message from the channels’ contents; and, if
possible, report any modified/insecure channels.
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4.3.4 Adversarial Action
Eve can conduct any of the three attacks: interception, jamming, or MITM. The
amount of information she gains through an interception, or eavesdropping attack
depends on the fragmentation of the message. For a jamming, or Denial of Service
(DoS) attack, Eve selects a channel(s) to jam, and simply deletes the channel file’s
contents. This prevents Bob from receiving the selected channel(s). Eve can conduct
both a loud or silent MITM attack. For a loud attack, Eve selects a channel, and
modifies as many bits as she desires (specified by the user), and writes the result
back to the channel file. However, Bob will be able to detect the modification with
the CRC, and can potentially recover from the modifications using the RS code,
depending on the number of errors introduced. If Eve utilizes a silent attack, after
modifying the data, she recalculates the channel’s CRC or RS code. This will cause
Bob to initially accept the channel’s contents.
4.3.5 Assumptions
This protocol currently assumes that there are no timing delays or buffering be-
tween the sender and the receiver. These delays could have been added in Python,
however, the information they provide is outside the scope of this research. Concepts
such as packet queuing, delays, and buffering have been thoroughly researched by
information theorists and network architects. Their effects would only affect the de-
livery of specific messages on a given channel, but that delivery is guaranteed through
protocols such as TCP. Thus, each channel’s data represents the entirety of that chan-
nel’s communication for a given session, without any per-channel fragmentation due
to Maximum Transmission Units (MTUs) of a given transmission method. This rep-
resents the data passed from the TCP packet to all higher-ordered protocols, which
include security protocols such as TLS. For our system, all channels’ data will be
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brought together for decryption and reconstruction. The receiver, Bob, knows the
length of the message. This ensures that the sender and receiver are synchronized.
The receiver would know the length of packets on each channel, and can utilize that
information to verify the length of the corresponding message. This proof of con-
cept assumes that the channels are homogeneous - having identical characteristics for
bandwidth, latency, and reliability. This work does not consider the initialization,
synchronization, and tear down of the channels between the sender and the receiver.
Similarly, this work does not address the use of non-uniform channels. The fragmen-
tation of data unevenly due to unique channel characteristics is important to consider
when taking a holistic view of the communication scenario including available QoS
parameters and specific channel vulnerabilities, and ought to be considered in future
research into the development of multi-channel communications.
4.3.6 Test Cases
A total of 12 transmission scenarios were conducted: three and ten channels; CRC
and RS Code MACs; and SDF = {0, 1, 2}. Each scenario was executed for each of
the three test files, giving a total of 36 tests. As previously discussed, there was no
need to conduct any replicate cases. The only stochastic effect in these test cases are
the specific amounts of message data transmitted on a given channel. Each channel
should carry a probabalistically equal amount of data, equal to:
Lch =
1 + SDF
n
However, the minor differences in channel load caused by the splitting mechanism
does not affect the actual security services of a given configuration, or the ability of
the system to recover from adversarial action. The test scenarios will allow us to
demonstrate that the proof of concept system works as designed. Eve can conduct
50
each of the attacks; however, attack success is solely dependent on the transmission
setup. We can analytically determine whether Eve is successful for each of the 36
test cases, for any of the three attack types. For this reason, adversarial action is not
considered as a specific test case.
The three files were selected to simulate different transmission lengths. “Ulysses”,
which is 275 Bytes presents a small transmission, which is smaller than the MTU for
a TCP packet. The other two files demonstrate the performance of the system over
a sequence of several TCP packets. The traditional MTU for a TCP transmission
is 1500 bytes. Thus, by transmitting 196.83KB for the Maroon Bells image, and
183.86KB for “Hamlet”, it simulates the transmission of a message which would
require several TCP fragments.
The selection of the number of channels reflects the benefits of a multi-channel
communication scenario. Previous work utilized a two-channel system, and is de-
scribed in [3]. However, the main drawback of that work was that with two channels,
the user must determine which attack vector to mitigate, and cannot address all
attack vectors simultaneously. It can address jamming by duplicating the entire mes-
sage’s contents on both channels, it can only address an interception attack by sending
partial data on each channel; and it cannot provide real-time indications regarding a
MITM attack. By running the system with three channels, this allows simultaneous
resilience to all attack vectors by varying the amount of duplication. Thus, three
channels was the first true demonstration of the system. The upper bound was set
at ten channels. Theoretically, each “channel” in the channel set would be unique,
whether in frequency or medium. Examples of these types of channels include wired
links between destinations, 2.4GHz and 5.0GHz wireless frequencies, and Bluetooth.
Thus, by setting the upper limit to 10, this includes a channel “slot” for all ma-
jor communication technologies, while still providing meaningful information on the
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performance of the system.
The choice of MAC reflects two independent functions: error detection and error
correction. Error detection can be used when the amount of overhead needs to be
constrained or pre-defined, when the cost of a re-transmission is minimal, or when the
likelihood of an integrity attack is minimal. The use of the CRC defines the amount
of overhead based on the number of channels utilized, while providing significant
error detection. The use of a RS code allows the user to correct a defined number of
transmission errors. The (255, 245) RS code was selected, which requires 10 bytes of
overhead for every 245 bytes of data. However, this ECC can correct errors of up to
5 bytes (in each 245 bytes of data). The overall transmission will be larger because
the required overhead is a percentage of the message length, but it prevents the need
to retransmit information given transmission errors on the specified channel.
The final experimental choice was varying the SDFs. The choice of SDF values
was made specifically for the three channel setup, and then replicated with ten chan-
nels. With a SDF = 0, the system demonstrates the transmission of a single copy of
the message, which mimics current transmissions. However, by fragmenting that copy
of the message across the available channels, the aforementioned security services can
be provided. Increasing the SDF to 1 provides the minimal amount of duplication
to recover from a single channel degradation, whether adversarial or otherwise. And
finally, SDF = 2 would indicate the full transmission of the message on each available
channel for three channels, and would provide resilience to two channel degradation
for the ten channel case.
4.4 Summary
This chapter presented the design decisions made in the creation of a proof of
concept design. This system works to demonstrate the capabilities of a multi-channel
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communication system. It also illustrates the areas where future network designers
will have the most flexibility in creating a successful multi-channel communication
scheme: the selection of the splitting mechanism, and the methods for error detection
and correction being the most pertinent. There were several abstractions that were
taken, such as not actually transmitting information across a network using several
simultaneous connections. However, the use of internet connections would not give
any additional benefit as the proof of concept gives no guarantee of scalable efficiency
as it is currently implemented.
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V. Observations and Analysis
5.1 Proof of Concept Results
This chapter will describe the insights gained through the proof of concept system,
and analyze those insights with respect to the effectiveness and uses of a multi-channel
protocol.
5.1.1 Overhead Data for Transmission
As previously discussed, the amount of overhead incurred through the test cases
can be pre-calculated. For any system utilizing the CRC-32, there are 32 bits of
overhead for each copy of the message (indicated by the SDF), and 32 bits of overhead
for each channel’s CRC.
Overhead = 4 · (SDF + 1) + (4 · n)
For scenarios using the RS Code, there are 4 bytes of overhead for the original message
(CRC), and then each channel incurs a 10
245
= 4.08% overhead relative to the amount
of data carried on the channel. Because each channel carries an equal amount of data
(probabilistically), the total system will incur 4.08% overhead for each total copy of
the message transmitted, as well as a 100% overhead for each additional copy of the
message.
Overhead = 4 + (SDF + 1) · (|M |+ 4) · 10
245
+ |M | · SDF
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The above two equations give the amount of overhead in bytes. To convert it into
a percentage, one must simply divide the result by |M |. The predicted results are
shown in Tables 2-4.
ECC Number of Channels
SDF
0 1 2
CRC
3 5.82% 107.27% 208.73%
10 16.00% 117.45% 218.91%
RS
3 12.36% 113.82% 226.18%
10 37.82% 139.27% 240.73%
Table 2. Ulysses Predicted Overhead
ECC Number of Channels
SDF
0 1 2
CRC
3 0.01% 100.01% 200.01%
10 0.02% 100.02% 200.02%
RS
3 4.08% 108.17% 212.25%
10 4.09% 108.18% 212.26%
Table 3. Hamlet Predicted Overhead
ECC Number of Channels
SDF
0 1 2
CRC
3 0.01% 100.01% 200.01%
10 0.02% 100.02% 200.02%
RS
3 4.08% 108.17% 212.25%
10 4.09% 108.18% 212.26%
Table 4. Maroon Bells Predicted Overhead
For each of the three test files, simulations were performed for all possible con-
figurations of the following options: error detection (CRC) and error correction (RS
Code); 3 channels and 10 channels; and SDF = 0, 1, and 2. The measured overhead
from each test case, relative to the message size is, is shown in Tables 5-7 below.
These results are an affirmation that the predicted calculations in the amount
of overhead are reliable and that the model functions as desired. In summary, the
difference between the predicted overhead and the measured overhead was averaged
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ECC Number of Channels
SDF
0 1 2
CRC
3 6.18% 108.00% 208.73%
10 17.45% 119.27% 220.73%
RS
3 12.73% 114.55% 226.18%
10 39.27% 141.09% 242.55%
Table 5. Ulysses Overhead Percentages
ECC Number of Channels
SDF
0 1 2
CRC
3 0.01% 100.01% 200.01%
10 0.02% 100.03% 200.03%
RS
3 4.09% 108.17% 212.26%
10 4.10% 108.19% 212.28%
Table 6. Hamlet Overhead Percentages
ECC Number of Channels
SDF
0 1 2
CRC
3 0.01% 100.01% 200.01%
10 0.02% 100.03% 200.03%
RS
3 4.09% 108.17% 212.26%
10 4.12% 108.19% 212.27%
Table 7. Maroon Bells Overhead Percentages
across each of the test cases (average across the test files for a given transmission
configuration), giving the results in Table 8.
ECC Number of Channels
SDF
0 1 2
CRC
3 1.00 4.33 5.33
10 3.67 7.33 9.67
RS
3 10.43 7.19 8.29
10 25.33 22.42 21.52
Table 8. Difference Between Predicted and Measured Overhead (Bytes)
The maximum value was a 25 byte difference in total overhead, across 10 channels.
This was most likely padding errors from the simulated transmission when they were
written into text files. An analysis of the overhead percentage reveals a fundamental
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trade-off for the end-user. When the transmission is small, relative to the given
MACs, such as for “Ulysses” (shown in 2 and 5), the overhead required for MAC
represents a significant percentage of the total transmission. This occurs because
the CRC occupies 4 bytes for the message, and 4 bytes for each channel utilized.
With no duplication, that incurred overhead is large relative to the 275 bytes of data.
However, when transmissions are large, such as for “Hamlet” and “Maroon Bells”, the
overhead percentage for the MAC is small. When using the CRC, there are 4 bytes
of overhead for the message’s CRC, and an additional 4 bytes of overhead for each
channel. However, when using the RS Codes, there is a fixed overhead, relative to the
size of the message. The selected (255,245) RS Code indicates that there are 10 bytes
of overhead for every 245 bytes of data, or a 4.08% overhead cost. The end user can
choose how many bytes to allocate for error correction based on their given security
needs. One can also see the effect on changing the SDF. An increase in the SDF
causes the overhead to increase by 100% for each integer step of SDF because this
refers to the total number of additional copies of the message which are transmitted in
a given communication session. The increase in message data additionally increases
the overhead of the RS Code transmissions. However, the change in SDF causes no
additional change in the number of overhead bytes required for error detection.
These results support that the design decisions in this protocol give network de-
signers the flexibility and tradespace necessary to tailor a multi-channel communica-
tion system to meet security requirements. If an end user requires minimal overhead,
they can simply chose to utilize error detection, making the total incurred overhead
small. However, if communication integrity is the main concern, a RS Code might
indicate a better selection. This would allow the end user to select the percentage to
devote to overhead, and receive a corresponding guarantee of integrity, given that a
2 · t length RS Code can correct up to t errors. The proof of concept design illustrates
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the design trade-offs that the end users can make, specifically through the analysis
of the required overhead. However, this does not address the overhead required to
establish, maintain, and tear down the unique network connections.
5.1.2 Attack Effectiveness
RFC 3552 clarifies the terminology for writing the security considerations for
future RFCs. Additionally, it specifies the following attack environment [12]:
We assume that the attacker has nearly complete control of the commu-
nications channel over which the end-systems communicate. This means
that the attacker can read any PDU (Protocol Data Unit) on the network
and undetectably remove, change, or inject forged packets onto the wire.
This includes being able to generate packets that appear to be from a
trusted machine. Thus, even if the end-system with which you wish to
communicate is itself secure, the Internet environment provides no assur-
ance that packets which claim to be from that system in fact are.
This section will detail the effectiveness of this protocol to mitigate the three
major attacks: Interception, Jamming, and Man in the Middle, occurring on a single
channel of communication. As stated above, this assumes that the attacker can access
the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) of any compromised channel, if desired.
5.1.2.1 Interception
The first type of attack is an interception, or eavesdropping attack. An adversary
performing this attack only intercepts the portion of the message carried on the given
channel. However, the adversary does not know which bits they have intercepted,
nor how many bits are missing from the complete message. This reduces the usable
information that can be gained significantly. Eve was only able to successfully decode
the message when the SDF = n − 1, indicating that the entire message was sent
on each channel. When there was no duplication used, Eve only recovered partial
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information. This is due to the splitting mechanism employed, and resulted in a brute
force search over the missing bits, as well as the proper arrangement of the intercepted
information. However, if the sender uses any duplication, and Eve intercepts every
channel, there exists the potential to decode the message by leveraging the matching
values of duplicated bits. If the user believes there is a risk for every channel to be
intercepted, additional entropy might need to be added to the message transmission
to prevent a successful interception.
5.1.2.2 Jamming
A jamming, or DoS attack seeks to undermine the availability of a given message.
Eve was able to destroy the message for all scenarios which had no duplication because
there was no redundant information with which to re-combine the entire message.
Because Bob would know which channel’s information was lost, as well as the data
type and structure of the data, there may exist methods with which he could recover
the jammed information. However, the ability to perform this recovery is outside the
scope of this research. As long as the number of jammed channels was less than or
equal to the SDF , Bob was able to successfully receive and decode the message with
jamming attacks.
5.1.2.3 Man in the Middle
The most sophisticated attack is the MITM or injection. This presumes that
the adversary successfully modifies the information of a given compromised channel,
including its channel MAC, so that the channel’s information is accepted at the
destination. The goal of a MITM attack is to successfully inject erroneous data at the
destination, while simultaneously intercepting the original information. The resilience
against the interception aspect of the MITM attack is identical to the aforementioned
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interception attack, and will not be addressed here. If Eve only desires to intercept
information, it is not a MITM attack. Similarly, if Eve only wants to prevent receipt
of the message entirely, it is simply jamming attack. Thus, one must assume that the
adversary desires the destination to accept its injection. Traditionally, if an adversary
can conduct a MITM attack, the victim only recognizes the attack when its erroneous
data causes a downstream effect, or if the receiving application detects an anomaly.
A multi-channel protocol can prevent this vulnerability entirely.
The main mechanism for this protection stems from the distribution of the mes-
sage’s MAC across the channels, and the duplication of information. Bob will accept
the modified channel’s contents because Eve modified the channel-specific MAC.
However, the message’s MAC was split at the bit level, and then distributed across
the set of channels. Eve does not know which bit(s) of the affected channel represent
that MAC. If the entire message is not on the vulnerable channel, there is no way
for Eve to properly modify the entire MAC because some portion resides on an un-
affected channel. When Bob attempts to re-assemble the message from the discrete
portions carried on each channel, the changes will result in a failed message MAC.
Eve conducted two types of MITM attacks: a “noisy” attack, where she did
not modify the channel’s MAC, and a more sophisticated “silent” attack, where she
recalculated the channel MAC after injecting errors/modifying information. For the
“noisy” attack, Bob was able to detect the attack through the channel’s MAC; and if
using a RS Code, potentially correct the errors depending on the size of the RS Code
and the amount of errors injected by Eve. The “silent” attack caused Bob to accept
each channel’s transmission. However, the distributed message MAC indicated the
presence of erroneous information during the recombination process. At worst, the
MITM attack becomes a jamming, or DoS attack because it prevents the message
from successful receipt, which occurs when Eve compromises x > SDF channels.
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However, when Eve compromises x ≤ SDF channels, Bob was able to successfully
detect the attack, identify the compromised channel(s), and recover the message
without requiring retransmission by comparing the duplicate fragments to identify
which channels had been modified.
5.1.2.4 Perfect Detection
Dolev et al. posited the existence of a communication system which can be both
perfectly secure and perfectly resilient. However, it relied on a multi-round approach
which allowed the sender and receiver to identify vulnerable communication links,
and remove those links from the set of available channels. Thus, their system was
only resilient if there were enough secure channels.
In practice, there is no way to guarantee enough channels to provide perfect re-
silience to an end-user. But what if there was a related metric - perfect detection
- which guarantees the sender and the receiver will detect adversarial action. This
term applies only to the MITM or injection or jamming1 attacks because, for most
channel mediums, there is no reliable mechanism to detect whether or not an adver-
sary has eavesdropped on a transmission unless the eavesdropping affects the signal
itself, which would then be considered an injection attack. Provided Bob was expect-
ing to receive a message, a jamming attack is always detectable - the absence of a
transmission on a given channel, or a transmission arrives in such a condition that it
is completely unusable. However, successful MITM or injection attacks can easily go
undetected.
The proposed multi-channel protocol provides this detection guarantee, even if the
adversary has compromised the entire set of channels in use. An adversary cannot
conduct a successful MITM attack, under any of the transmission scenarios, because
1There is no way to distinguish between channel degradation due to non-adversarial means and
an attack, but they have identical attacks and would most likely require the same form of response
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the system distributes the message MAC across the available channels. When the
receiver attempts to re-combine the message, and it fails its integrity check, the re-
ceiver can verify the fragments on different channels to determine which fragments
had been modified. In the best case, the receiver will report which channel was com-
promised, and recover the original message without retransmission. In the worst
case, consider an adversary which modifies the contents of every available channel.
Without the splitting mechanism key, this adversary still has no knowledge of how
the message bits were fragmented, to include the message MAC. Thus, any changes
they make will be detected when the receiver recombines the message. If each channel
is modified, the effects will be no worse than a jamming adversary on each channel.
5.1.2.5 Attack Summary
This section described the system’s resilience to each of the main attack vectors.
By looking at the conditions for a “successful” attack, a pattern emerges. Let x be
the number of channels affected by Eve. If x < SDF channels have been affected, the
receiver will successfully detect any attack without the need for a retransmission. For
a MITM attack affecting x < SDF channels, the receiver can report which channels
have been affected. Additionally, if x ≥ SDF channels have been affected, the
transmission will fail. However, the system will know that its transmission has failed.
This presents a meaningful increase in the guarantees of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability for the end user.
5.2 Proof of Concept Insights
5.2.1 Implementation Challenges
The first, and most glaring challenge in the implementation of a multi-channel
communication architecture is how to define the communication channels between the
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sender and the receiver. We addressed this challenge by utilizing a pre-defined channel
set; however, this limits the system’s flexibility. Similarly, given that the splitting
mechanism relies upon the communicated session parameters, the communication of
those parameters must use existing key exchange mechanisms over one or multiple
channels in the channel set, or be communicated out of band. How to communicate
these parameters is a design choice for the end user based on their specific security
needs. There must also be dynamic operation/channel configuration to address the
possibility that a given channel can become unresponsive or experience degraded
performance. These primary challenges would likely be resolved as protocols such as
TLS develop support for multi-channel systems.
The system must also address the issue of error detection and correction. Given a
cryptographically secure splitting mechanism, if a bit is lost (and has not been recov-
ered using forward error correction), the joining mechanism will be unable to piece
together the final message without knowing which particular bit was lost. Thus, there
must be error detection and/or correction utilized for each channel’s information. Our
system design relies on the use of CRC and RS code systems for error detection and
correction, respectively.
Another challenge that needs to be addressed is how each particular component
addresses the security configuration of the system. There exist relationships between
the resilience of a given security scheme, the overhead required to implement that
scheme, and an inverse relationship between integrity and confidentiality. As the
amount of overhead increases, and more information is duplicated, the system achieves
better integrity and confidentiality. The user does not directly specify a confidentiality
and integrity requirement, but rather attains those services through the selection of
error correction and the amount of duplication.
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5.2.2 Timing and Storage Complexity
The operation of the designed system is broken into the following parts: system
initialization and key exchange, fragmenting and sending, transit, and finally receip-
t/recombination.
The most computationally intensive portion of the entire system is the key ex-
change, which utilizes the DHKE mechanism. The key exchange’s security relies on
the discrete logarithm problem, and is discussed in detail in [25]. Yakymenko et al.
in [26] proves that the temporal complexity of modular exponentiation, required for
the computation of a DHKE key, is O(b · ln3 b), where b is the size of the modulus p
from the DHKE in bits.
To fragment and send the message, it requires log2(n) operations to generate a
fragment for a message bit, and that must be performed |M | = m times. As the
system processes each byte, it computes the error correcting code for the message,
requiring O(1) operations. After fragmenting the entire message, each channel com-
putes its own, per-channel ECC, which occurs in O(m
8
) = O(m) time. Thus, this
portion of the system operates in O(m · log2(n)) time. However, in practice the num-
ber of channels will always be much less than the size of the message in bits, so this
becomes O(m). This also accounts for the inclusion of the message and channel error
correcting codes The transmission of the message is not included in timing analy-
sis because it depends purely on the transmission time and end-to-end delay of a
communication link/interface.
Receiving and recombining the message operates similarly to sending, with the
exception of when the system must recover an adversarially modified message. If each
channel transmits securely, the recombination is O(m · log2(n)) = O(m). However,
the recombination of a modified transmission depends on the allowed attempts. The
system can attempt to recover errors on x channels, where 0 ≤ x ≤ n − 1, because
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there must be at least one correct transmission. Each recombination required m
operations, and in the worst case it would require the full nested structure. Thus, the
recombination would occur in O(mx).
The storage needs of a system in operation depends primarily on how much du-
plication the user requires. We selected the Trivium cipher purely because its im-
plementation is small in hardware, requiring only 180 bits of state. The operation
of this system requires the ability to recombine the message from some of its parts
(if there are errors), which indicates the requirement to store each channel’s contents
in a buffer. Because each channel could potentially carry the entire message, these
buffers would need to be m·n
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bytes. Again considering the fact that m >> n, the
storage requirements in practice are O(m), and thus reasonable for use.
5.3 Discussion
5.3.1 Implementation in Existing Architecture
One of the main questions regarding this system is how it would interact with the
existing TCP/Internet Protocol (IP). There is an argument that could be made for
including it as a form of a session layer protocol because it relies on several available
channels, which would each consist of their own TCP/UDP connection. However, the
transport layer may also be the natural place for this idea to reside. Consider that
TLS was specifically designed to be flexible to allow for a changing cyber security
paradigm. This protocol could provide the catalyst for the development of multi-
channel communication systems, which can achieve security even if attacks outpace
the development of suitable encryption schemes. Thus, there is a reasonable likelihood
of TLS or another protocol adopting this approach while developing the support for
a multi-channel security system.
The proposed system demonstrates a solution that would work with a protocol
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that allows for the creation and synchronization of multiple channels. Given a set of
channels between the client and the server, this system would be able to function as
a cipher suite for TLS. Relying on existing nomenclature, the user would simply need
to specify the method of key exchange, such as the following examples
• TLS RSA - public and private keys
• TLS DH - Diffie-Hellman
• TLS DHE - ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
• TLS ECDH - elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
The user also needs to specify which MAC to use. TLS currently utilizes Hash-based
Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) for stream cipher use, where HMACs are a
special form of MAC that provide for both message integrity and authenticity. These
are currently denoted as follows
• HMAC-MD5
• HMAC-SHA1
• HMAC-SHA256/384
To match the existing TLS nomenclature, the MACs we utilized would be denoted as
either CRC-32 or RS. This only leaves the session parameters for the fragmentation
factor and duplication level, based on the number of channels. Thus, the client can
offer the following items:
• FF-X - The # of fragments the message will be broken into
• DF-X - The duplication level for the session
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By modifying the proposed multi-channel system as a cipher suite for a future version
of TLS, the following would be used to communicate the session parameters, where
X ≤ n, and specified by the client at system initialization.
• TLS DH CRC-32 FF-X DF-X
• TLS DH RS FF-X DF-X
The concept of a “channel” has been intentionally vague throughout this work.
For optimal security, each channel would consist of physically distinct communication
mediums. This would require an adversary to address each channel’s physical char-
acteristics individually, making attacks significantly more challenging. Each physical
medium requires different transmission capabilities, and offers different performance
with respect to transmission time and other delays (I.e. a fiber optic connection
has significantly different performance than a wireless, 2.4GHz transmission). The
same security services could be provided by instantiating unique TCP connections
for each channel. While each transmission would stem from the same transmitter,
each connection will take different routes to the destination, and have a unique port
on the destination device. If an adversary did not know specifically which ports
contain the transmission, this still represents a non-trivial task to gain any mean-
ingful information. As previously discussed, even if the adversary has access to each
channel, re-assembling the fragmented message into meaningful data presents a com-
putational challenge for the adversary, maintaining the security requirements for the
end user. This would allow systems to utilize the security provided by multi-channel
data fragmentation, even if they only have access to a single channel.
5.3.2 Implementation in Critical Infrastructure
The encryption/authentication methods utilized in this proof of concept system
would not meet the current security requirements for widespread implementation
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in critical infrastructure communications. However, it demonstrates several of the
concepts that need to be thought through and solved for its implementation. This
solution demonstrates the benefits to utilizing multiple channels, specifically when the
data is split at the bit level in a non-predictable/pseudorandom way. Assuming there
exists an adversary that can break the encryption of a given channel, they do not
know which bits they have decrypted, nor how those bits fit into the overall message.
Thus, an adversary would require the interception/compromise of several channels in
the channel set to gain any meaningful information. This supports the confidentiality
requirement specified in [12] for network communications. Similarly, because the
message’s MAC is distributed across channels, the system can detect changes to a
particular channel, even if the adversary modifies the information in such a way that
it passes the channel specific MAC. This supports the integrity requirement specified
in [12].
The framework can thus be applied to existing critical infrastructure commu-
nication, where the primary concerns are message integrity and confidentiality, as
discussed in Section 2.6. By fragmenting that data across multiple channels for in-
frastructure communications, the required adversarial action to break the system
increases considerably, because they need to intercept/modify multiple channels; and
even with several channels at their disposal, still need to break the data splitting
mechanism at the endpoints. If an end user determines that the Trivium cipher does
not provide an adequate level of security to the splitting mechanism, it can be re-
placed with a more secure alternative. The use of encryption can be applied to the the
original message, the individual channels, or both, depending on the user’s tolerance
for overhead and timing.
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5.4 Summary
This section outlined the insights into the operation of a multi-channel commu-
nication system through the use of a proof of concept system. The proof of concept
system did not utilize networked transmissions, but simulated those transmissions
by using unique files to represent the source, destination, and channel transmissions.
This demonstrated the amount of incurred overhead for either error detection or error
correction modes, as well as the effect on the number of channels and the number of
unique message fragments. The selection between error detection and error correc-
tion gives the user the choice between a constant overhead cost and an overhead cost
relative to the size of the transmitted message. Additionally, the use of duplication
demonstrated resilience to multiple attack vectors. As long as the entire message is
not transmitted on an individual channel, this system can provide security against
interception/eavesdropping attacks; however, if every channel can be simultaneously
intercepted, additional entropy might be needed to provide the same guarantees for
communication security.
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VI. Conclusion
6.1 Overview
This thesis investigated the security of a multi-channel communication system
which relies on data fragmentation at the bit level to provide security services to
the end user. It presented terminology to describe multi-channel communications,
and applied it to a theoretical system. A proof of concept system was prototyped
to demonstrate its operation. This proof of concept system allowed analysis of the
implementation challenges related to building such a system, and provided possible
solutions. Areas where the user can make design decisions based on their specific use
case were identified, as well as the trade-offs between the cost incurred and the services
gained. This demonstrated the tunable nature of a multi-channel communication
protocol, and the resilience it provides to adversarial action. Finally, current security
systems were evaluated to determine where this architecture would fit within existing
network paradigms.
6.2 Summary
Chapter II of this thesis laid the groundwork for the proposed architecture. Among
the topics that were detailed are the CIA Triad, emphasizing the traditional secu-
rity needs which the proposed architecture must maintain in order to be adopted
for widespread use. The next topic was the TLS protocol, which is widely used to
secure network transmissions. Throughout its lifecycle, the architects of TLS have
demonstrated a willingness to adapt, as evidenced by its pattern of updates to meet
changing cryptographic and security needs. It is a natural extension, then, that such
a protocol can adapt to support multi-channel communications. Correspondingly, the
TLS protocol’s use of cipher suites presents a natural fit for the proposed security
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protocol. Chapter II addressed the three main types of network attacks: intercep-
tion/eavesdropping, jamming, and MITM. Several mechanisms, such as the DHKE
algorithm, the use of LFSRs, and the error detection and correction provided by
CRC and RS codes were described for future use in the proof of concept design. The
final section of pertinent background information involved the regulatory standards
requiring network security for all aspects of the CIA Triad.
Chapter III established the terminology and theory for a multi-channel communi-
cation protocol. This theory was applied to a hypothetical multi-channel system to
establish such a system’s benefits and uses. The primary mechanism for this protocol
is connecting each data bit to a corresponding fragment identifier, and then assign-
ing these fragments to specific channels. This allows the communication system to
distribute the message contents, as well as its MAC across the available channels. By
distributing that information across the available channels, such a system provides
resilience for the user against the three main attack vectors. However, this resilience
comes at the cost of additional transmitted information in the form of MACs and
duplicated data.
Chapter IV described the development of the proof of concept system. Specifically,
each step in the proof of concept’s operation is outlined from session initialization
through message receipt. It describes some of the specific design choices to improve
the proof of concept’s efficiency This establishes the design decisions made for the
system, and highlights the flexibility a multi-channel communication system could
provide the end user.
Chapter V analyzed the operation of the proof of concept system. It details the
overhead incurred through the design decisions, as well as the associated resilience
to adversarial action. This highlights the design trade-offs available to the network
designer, illustrating the tunability of such a system to meet specific needs. Following
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the design trade-offs, the lessons learned through the proof of concept design are
described in two specific areas. The first area is the challenges in this protocol’s
implementation. These challenges must be solved prior to widespread adoption of
such a system. Most of these challenges were abstracted in the proof of concept
system, such as the use of pre-established “channels”, and not negotiating a specific
channel set upon initialization of a communication session. Analysis of the timing and
storage complexity of the proof of concept system suggested that the basic operation
is realistic relative to the size of the message’s length. Suggestions for how this system
could be implemented in current architectures were discussed, specifically as a cipher
suite for a future version of TLS which supports multi-channel communications, as
well as a specific sector - critical infrastructure - which could benefit from the use of a
multi-channel communication system. Chapter V concludes with a discussion of the
future work required to bring this architecture to fruition.
6.3 Research Contributions
This work classifies a novel communication architecture which can achieve secu-
rity without relying on traditional encryption methods. Instead, it relies on bit level
fragmentation and distribution of data across multiple, unique communication chan-
nels. This system can provide simultaneous resilience to jamming, eavesdropping,
and MITM attacks. This system duplicates message data to prevent a single channel
from becoming a single point of failure (jamming). It fragments message data at the
bit level using a cryptographically secure splitting mechanism to prevent any channel
from carrying meaningful data (eavesdropping). And finally, by both fragmenting
and duplicating information across the set of channels, it can detect sophisticated
MITM attacks, report the affected channel(s), and potentially recover the message
without requiring retransmission.
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This thesis also proposed a specific network layer where this architecture could
be reasonably implemented within current security systems, facilitating the adoption
of this protocol with minimal changes to existing infrastructure. The most appealing
candidate for this implementation is the popular TLS protocol, which operates over
TCP connections. Finally, this work evaluated and identified several specific develop-
ments/challenges that must be solved in order to field a multi-channel communication
system.
6.4 Future Work
To determine if this proposed system is truly viable, it must be tested in an
environment where performance can be measured relative to other secure network
paradigms. Future work in this area should therefore include full system develop-
ment, both as part of the existing TLS protocol, and perhaps as a custom hardware
solution, and verify that the communication sessions can be established, maintained,
and used effectively with normal internet traffic/communications. This would address
the buffering/timing delay challenges. Those challenges have been comprehensively
analyzed for traditional network communications, but would need modification to
apply to this framework, as the total network traffic increases in a non-linear fashion
as the number of channels increases.
A major benefit of a multi-channel system is the security services gained through
its use. However, the resilience to attacks was based purely on analysis of the in-
formation present on a given channel. The effectiveness of an eavesdropping attack
specifically was outside of the scope of this thesis. Future work would need to con-
duct a security analysis of the multi-channel system for each major type of attack.
This evaluation would rely on information theory to quantify how much information
an adversary gains by eavesdropping a channel carrying non-related, non-continuous
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portions of the original message. Additionally, this work would generate relationships
between the amount of incurred overhead, and the levels of Confidentiality, Integrity,
and Availability provided. It would also allow for more direct comparison between a
multi-channel system and traditional security models to allow network architects to
determine if the multi-channel system is worth the additional investment. Finally, this
would allow a user to define the security of their system given user-specific run-time
decisions.
6.5 Conclusion
This thesis contends that security protocols should develop support for multi-
channel communications because of the security services multiple channels provide.
The proposed multi-channel communication protocol relies on data fragmentation
at the bit level to secure its transmissions, and demonstrates the resilience gained
through its use. A proof of concept system provided insights into valuable services,
such as the ability to detect and defeat a MITM attack, without re-transmission, and
report which channel was compromised. It illustrated both the system’s resilience
to adversarial action, and the system’s tunable nature. This system utilized existing
mechanisms for the key exchange that communicated initialization information; the
splitting mechanism that mapped data to a specific channel; and the ECCs that
provided error detection and correction. This suggests that a multi-channel protocol
can be created from existing systems. The proof of concept also illuminated several of
the remaining challenges for such a protocol to achieve widespread implementation,
such as how to securely determine the channel set prior to a communication session’s
initialization.
This work serves as a starting point for security architects to develop a secure,
multi-channel communication system, highlighting several key challenges. This frame-
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work would fit into future implementations of TLS or similar protocols developed to
support multi-channel communications. By increasing the number of channels uti-
lized, a communication system can be tailored to the specific needs of an end-user,
gaining a corresponding increase to all aspects of the CIA triad, even in the presence
of adversarial action. Ultimately, a multi-channel communication system promises to
increase the standard required for an attacker to gain meaningful information (Con-
fidentiality), to modify the transmitted information (Integrity), or to prevent the
customer from its use (Availability).
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